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In the recent US presidential election the Obama and McCain campaigns respectively spent
$730mn and $368mn. Obama in particular also managed to recruit several million volun-
teers, who contributed labor as well as money to their candidate.1 It seems likely, taken
in aggregate, that such resources played a part in the election outcome.2 Furthermore, the
non-trivial sums of both money3 and time contributed are of course endogenous variables;
but there is incomplete understanding of how contributors respond to policy platforms, and
in turn how policy is modiﬁed to appeal to contributors.
An improved understanding of the linkages between policy, voting and contributions
is desirable because there are important policy issues at stake. Calls for legal limits on
either donations or campaign expenditure are frequently heard, typically on the grounds
that such sums of money are perceived inevitably to be associated with corruption or some
other distortion of policy. On the other hand economists and political scientists alike have
frequently taken a more agnostic position, recognizing that ﬁnance can have an important
functional role in the electoral process.
In our analysis two parties compete for election, setting policy deﬁned by ideological posi-
tion, and expenditure on public goods. Voters are distributed uniformly along the ideological
scale, but all voters prefer greater amounts of the public good for given taxes. In contrast
1Exact numbers of volunteers are not readily available, though an article in Time magazine (Newton-
Small, 2008) reported an estimated 8mn for the Obama campaign. Obama’s advantage in volunteers was
at least clearly manifest in direct voter contact. Data from the American National Election Studies Time
Series Study reveal that 17% of the population were contacted directly by the Democrats against 9% for the
Republicans (Panagopoulos and Francia, 2009).
2The legitimacy of this argument is addressed in the literature review below.
3Notwithstanding the question posed by Ansolabehere et al (2003).
1party leaders are motivated by oﬃce, and the wedge between tax and public good expen-
diture. Any surplus may be spent on ego-projects, wasted through bureaucracy, or more
simply may reﬂect pure rent-seeking. By deﬁnition the greater the level of rent-seeking, the
lower the quality of government. Importantly, voting is argued to be determined both by
policy as well as by campaigning activities, which in turn are supported by ﬁnancial dona-
tions and the contributed labor of activists - inputs which are themselves also determined by
policy. But as we detail below the policy preferences of contributors are in general diﬀerent
from those of potential voters. In particular we assume they are more ideologically extreme,4
and may also in general be distinct in how they respond to the quality of government. Be-
cause of random popularity shocks, elections are an imperfect check on politicians’ behavior
hence in equilibrium public good provision is inevitably below the optimum and there is an
endogenously determined amount of public sector waste.5 This waste depends critically on
the respective but distinct responsiveness of donors, activists and potential voters to policy,
as well as the potency of party campaigns in driving the vote.
A considerable academic literature has already pointed out that voters’ turnout rates
cannot be taken for granted.6 Whilst voting may be a low cost activity the expected ben-
eﬁts at the level of the individual voter would appear to be vanishingly small. In such
circumstances behavior can change critically depending on eﬀorts made by parties in the
run up to an election. To make this idea operational we deﬁne ‘political capital’ as the set
of assets available to parties which can help deliver the vote. This is made more concrete
4For example see Seyd et al (1996).
5This framework is used in a large and expanding literature, discussed in Persson and Tabellini (2000).
Persson et al (2003) analyze the determination of rents under alternative electoral rules.
6Aldrich (1993) explains the theoretical diﬃculties and Wattenberg (2003) provides empirical evidence
from around the world on (declining) turnout rates.
2in what follows, but it is important at the outset to emphasize that such factors may be
multi-dimensional. In particular we consider ﬁnance - advertising is not free, hence raising
money becomes important, as well as party activists.7
If voters do respond positively to advertising and campaigning, then raising ﬁnances and
pleasing activists becomes important to political parties. Given that donors and activists
are not ideologically representative of the electorate as a whole then party leaders face a
trade-oﬀ between ideological centralization as in standard Downsian models, and polarizing
to please activists and donors. Political capital thus can explain ideological divergence.8
However, the main focus of this paper is to analyze how the quality of government changes
depending on the importance of political capital in driving turnout, and separately on the
quantity of diﬀerent elements of political capital. A key lesson of our analysis is that there
should be a clear recognition of the distinction between importance and quantity. Whilst we
ﬁnd a strong case for wanting to reduce potency, we also ﬁnd that policy aimed at reducing
the volume of political capital, such as through limits on campaign expenditure, frequently
only serves to worsen the quality of government.
Our ﬁrst main ﬁnding is that for most parameterizations the greater the potency of po-
litical capital in driving the vote, the greater the equilibrium level of rent-seeking and hence
the lower the quality of government. A key determinant of this, obviously, is the relative
sensitivity of potential voters and political capital to public spending. Certainly if potential
voters are suﬃciently more sensitive to public spending then greater potency of political cap-
ital is detrimental to government quality. Parties set policy so as to maximize votes and if
7Wattenberg (2002) and Moon (2004) also argue for a strong functional role for party activists.
8There are already a large number of separate explanations for polarization. This literature is partially
reviewed below.
3turnout can be bought through pleasing contributors rather than directly addressing voters’
concerns then under these circumstances the quality of government deteriorates. Addition-
ally, and less obviously, we ﬁnd that the ideological equilibrium also determines government
quality. When political capital is potent, then the ideological equilibrium is characterized by
polarity - parties are drawn to the extremes in order to please their contributors. However,
in this scenario there is only one margin on which additional votes can be bought by reduc-
ing rent-seeking. When parties are polarized they cannot garner additional votes from their
extreme ﬂanks. In contrast when both parties are centralized in accord with the median
voter, then both have two margins which can yield additional voters by reducing their rents,
hence lower equilibrium rent-seeking. Aside from the relative sensitivity of potential voters
and political capital to good governance there is therefore a separate reason for wanting to
reduce the potency of political capital in driving the vote. In light of this we therefore discuss
possible means to reduce the impact of political capital, in particular compulsory voting.
Reducing the importance of political capital is nonetheless a very distinct argument from
limiting the quantity of political capital through particular legal limits on campaign spending
and advertising. In order to address the consequences of speciﬁc legal limits the analysis
disaggregates political capital into constituent parts: national spending on advertising, local
spending, and activists. Our second main ﬁnding is that partial limits on total campaign
expenditure, as frequently observed in practice, are never optimal. The problem essentially
is that a partial limit is not compatible with maximizing the responsiveness of votes to better
government. Imposition of a ban removes a margin on which parties would otherwise want
to please donors by increasing public spending. It is nonetheless feasible that an absolute
ban on total spending could maximize the quality of government, depending on activists
4being suﬃciently more responsive to good government then donors. In this case the stronger
the ban on spending the better.
The third main ﬁnding is that any limit on national spending as distinct from local
spending simply serves to worsen the quality of government. Here the incentive to please
donors through improved government is simply removed. The fourth ﬁnding is that any
partial limit on local spending alone can never be optimal, as with partial limits on overall
spending. Because activism is substitutable with local expenditure an outright ban will
yield the optimum when activists are suﬃciently more responsive to good government than
donors.
In the next section we review some related literature before presenting the model frame-
work in Section 3. Equilibrium government quality and its relationship with the potency of
political capital is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes how government quality changes
when legal limits on spending are imposed and Section 6 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The argument that voters are somehow malleable and in particular that campaign expendi-
ture can aﬀect the vote is not uncontentious.9 Austen-Smith (1991) and Baba (1997) argue
that a positive voting response to campaign expenditure implies irrational voters because
expensive advertising is a visible sign that money was paid over to promote special inter-
ests against their own. On the other hand recent theoretical work identiﬁes a functional
role for advertising. Prat (2002) rationalizes advertising in a micro-founded model of cam-
9Our review of this literature is limited. Ashworth (2008) provides a good introduction to the issues
involved.
5paign advertising in which an interest group responds to insider signals relating to candidate
quality. The interest group is able to distort the policy platform (which is orthogonal to
candidate quality) in exchange for eﬀectively broadcasting candidate quality. Advertising
thus facilitates election of the better quality candidate. This insight is incorporated here in
that campaign advertising generates a positive voting response, and also that better quality
government generates larger donations and more willing activists thus creating a brake on
politicians’ rent-seeking behavior.10 Coate (2004) also highlights the importance of adver-
tising as a means of providing information about candidates.
Empirically Levitt (1994) found that campaign spending has little impact in determining
voting in US House elections. Nonetheless more recent work has been supportive of the link.
Ansolabehere and Iyengar (1996) ﬁnd that advertising inﬂuences voting in ﬁeld experiments.
Gerber (2004) and Moon (2006) provide a rationale for the weaker evidence that seems
to especially relate to incumbents, distinguishing between the objectives of maximizing vote
share and gaining re-election. In straightforward terms it is hard for an incumbent to increase
vote share, whilst evidence relating to re-election is more favorable. Relatedly Gerber and
Green (2000) provide experimental evidence in support of the idea that wider campaigning
activities undertaken by party activists have a positive eﬀect on voter turnout. Ultimately
the idea that campaign advertising matters, and hence that pleasing potential donors and
activists matters through policy seems to us to be worth pursuing.11
The proposition that donors and activists can inﬂuence the vote, together with the obser-
10If campaign advertising has no eﬀect on voting, then the question of why parties advertise at all is hard
to answer. Parties demonstrably do not have unlimited resources and could use scarce ﬁnances in other
ways.
11This idea is also explored by Denzau and Munger (1986) who model special interest groups as potential
donors.
6vation that party activists and donors are more skewed toward the political extremes provides
a mechanism underpinning ideological divergence. Of course, the academic literature is not
at all short of candidate explanations for divergence. Palfrey (1984) suggests putting your
party in the centre invites someone else to start a new one, place it on your outer ﬂank, and
steal all your support. Alternatively candidates might be policy motivated and partially lib-
erated from the median voter due to a degree of uncertainty (Wittman, 1983; Calvert, 1985;
Alesina, 1988.) The well-attested fact that incumbents have an advantage over challengers
has been used to develop models where the candidates have diﬀerent strategies which include
diﬀerent ideological positions (Londregan and Romer, 1993.) Schoﬁeld (2007) proposes that
low quality politicians move away from the centre, in order to distinguish themselves at least
on one dimension.
But a further version of the story - and one which is now popular following recent pres-
idential elections in the US - has parties tacking away from the centre to mobilize their
potential supporters actually to come out and vote for them (Peress, 2006). If both parties
occupy the center, radicals of left and right will abstain through alienation, while some voters
of all persuasions will abstain through indiﬀerence. ‘Indiﬀerence abstention’ is not in fact
a good reason to polarize your party. Staying close to your rival creates equal amounts of
indiﬀerence to both of you, which does not aﬀect your chances of winning. Losing your more
radical supporters through alienation, however, is a diﬀerent matter.
Political commentators like the story that you do better if you make your ‘core’ voters
turn out rather than chasing ﬂoating voters in the centre. (George Bush’s campaign of 2004
is held up as a successful example of this.) Political scientists have looked at the evidence
and are skeptical. Some of this skepticism rests on the ﬁnding that people who say they care
7a lot who wins are scarcely more likely to vote than people who care little (Rosenstone and
Hanson, 1993). So even if ‘core voters’ are alienated it doesn’t make them that much less
likely to vote.
But it may make them much less likely to work for or give money to the party and help
deliver other people’s votes. Party activists and donors have to date been a neglected force
in Downsian theories of spatial political competition.12 A notable exception, however, is
Aldrich (1983a, 1983b). Aldrich’s political activists are selected negatively — the ideologi-
cally alienated and indiﬀerent exclude themselves. Each party’s position is that of its median
activist. The ideological position and the cohort of activists are thus simultaneously deter-
mined, and Aldrich shows that this always gives an equilibrium where the two parties are
ideologically distinct. This an improvement over ‘candidate selection’ models where candi-
dates get nominated by replicating the views of their party’s median activist, a ﬁgure treated
as exogenous. Where such models do score over Aldrich is when they bring in candidates
who choose a position to maximize the joint probability of being nominated and then elected
(Aranson and Ordeshook, 1972).
In this article we combine the approaches of Aldrich and of Aranson and Ordeshook.
T h en u m b e ra n dp o l i t i c a ls t a n c eo fa c t i v i s t sa n dd o n o r si se n d o g e n o u s ,b u ta tt h es a m et i m e
someone is looking at the goal of being elected and sees pleasing the activists and potential
donors as just a means to that end. We assume in fact that party policy is decided centrally,
with an eye on both the potential vote and the political capital needed to get that vote
out. The ideological location decision turns out to be non-trivial: Ideology drives voting
12Roemer (2001) studies the behaviour of intra-party factions and ﬁnds that the presence of factions can
help to solve the problem of cycling in political equilibria. Related to the theory proposed in this paper Cox
(2006) studies redistributive politics and argues for a role for mobilisation.
8through more than one channel. A party that moves to the center may gain territory from
its opponent, but at the cost of party membership or income or both. For this reason parties
don’t necessarily converge in the middle.
However whilst ideological divergence is an interesting by-product of the analysis, the
main concern of our paper is the quality of government. A key relationship in the analysis
below is how donations respond to this variable. Donations have themselves been typically
modelled in the literature, in our opinion rather narrowly, as either ‘position-induced’ or
‘service-induced’ (Ashworth, 2008). In the former case donations buy ideological inﬂuence,
in the latter the quid pro quo is special favor "at the expense of citizens in general". On
the other hand Ansolabehere et al (2003) document that the vast majority of campaign
contributions in the case of the U.S. come in the shape of very small donations from indi-
viduals. Such donations seem inconsistent with policy procurement. Instead Ansolabehere
et al (2003) propose that donating is a form of political participation or consumption. One
possible story is that donors obtain a return in the shape of votes generated from ensuing
advertising. Relatedly, it is not impossible that donors are acting out of altruism. This may
be unappealing to much of the economics literature, but it has to be acknowledged that in
most cases the quid pro quo from donations is far from obvious. An example could be the
2008 US Presidential race in which Barack Obama enjoyed a massive ﬁnancial advantage
over John McCain. Anecdotal evidence at least suggests that in many cases the donors were
motivated through a perception that Obama was the more eﬀective candidate and not solely
through some self-interested agenda.13
13Of course whether or not this perception is correct is a question for posterity.
93 Model Framework
The basic framework is two-party pre-electoral competition where both parties simultane-
ously announce policy, consisting of an ideological position and spending on a public good (as
distinct from waste or rent). As is common in the literature we utilize a probabilistic voting
framework, ﬁrst proposed by Hinich (1977) and Lindbeck and Weibull (1987). Suppose there
are two parties,  and , facing an imminent election. Voters are forward-looking, parties
pre-commit to policy, and the penalties of reneging are prohibitive.
The parties’ objectives are symmetric, with party ’s expected utility function written
as
 = (1 − ) (1)
where  is its probability of being elected, and 0 ≤  ≤ 1 measures spending on a public
good. Parties (or more accurately party leaders) are motivated ﬁr s t l yb yo ﬃce, and secondly
the rents they may be able to extract in government. In (1) the normalized maximum
possible rent equals unity.14 There is no direct return to ideological position taking, but any
money not spent on public goods adds to utility. As described in the introduction this may
be spent on ego-projects, be wasted through bureaucracy, or more simply may reﬂect pure
rent-seeking. An alternative interpretation of  is that it represents politicians’ eﬀort (good
for voters, but a ‘bad’ for politicians). Whilst we use the term ‘rent-seeking’ it is worth
bearing in mind throughout that more general interpretations of  are possible and that it
is a measure of the overall quality of government.
So what determines , which is the probability that   05,  being the party’s
14This occurs when spending on the public good is zero. To make ideas concrete, suppose that  represents
the proportion of the ﬁxed public purse spent usefully. That which is not usefully spent is termed ‘rent’.
10share of the total vote? Deﬁne  ≡  + ∗
,w h e r e∗ is a random variable uniformly
distributed between −2 and +2,r e ﬂecting exogenous factors aﬀecting the popularity of
t h et w op a r t i e sa n d i st h es h a r eo ft h ev o t ew h e n∗ =0 . Henceforth upper case lettering
give values for variables when ∗ =0 , whilst lower case lettering represent realized values.
Without loss of generality assume ∗
 = −∗
 so that a positive shock for party  is also a
negative shock, of equal magnitude, for . It follows that




Party ’s probability of winning an election therefore depends on the vote share it would
w i ni nas h o c k - l e s sw o r l d( ) and the density of the popularity shock variable ().15
Notationally,  =

+ where  and  are the total votes won by the two parties.







where voting performance depends on the potential voter base () and party ﬁnances and
activists, or more generally the party machine, otherwise known as ‘political capital’ ().
This is a generalization of the standard Downsian model which is the special case of  =0 .I n
this section and the next the determination of policy is analyzed using an aggregate measure
of political capital, with the objective of asking how policy depends on the importance of
political capital as a whole in driving votes (as captured by ). Section 4 disaggregates
political capital into national advertising, local advertising and activism, enabling analysis
15I ti st h ep r e s e n c eo ft h es h o c k sw h i c he n a b l e sp a r t i e st og e n e r a t ep o s i t i v er e n t s .
11of the consequences of limiting campaign spending.
3.1 Potential Voters
Suppose the ideological scale runs from 0 (left) to 1 (right). Let  and  be the ideological
positions chosen by the two parties. Now suppose the electorate are uniformly distributed
across the ideological spectrum with the size of the electorate normalized to 1. The uniform
distribution is common to the literature (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2000) chapter 3) and
captures the concept of an ideologically diverse electorate. When ∗ =0 ,a n dg o v e r n m e n t
spending is the same by both parties, each elector is a potential voter for the party to which
she is closest ideologically. Thus voters whose  (personal ideological score) is less than
(greater than) ( + )/2 will vote, if they vote at all, for party  (party ).
Potential voters also respond to spending on the public good. Let the eﬀect be to increase
the number of potential  voters by ( − ) where 0. Thus a party can increase
its territory beyond the critical point ( + )/2 by spending more than its rival. If the
left-wing party spends more (  ) then the critical point is to the right of this point, and
if the right-wing party spends more then the critical point moves to the left. To summarize,
’s potential voters are deﬁned as
 =(  + )/2 + ( − ) (3)
123.2 Political Capital
Given the unanimity of political scientists (see e.g. Seyd et al, 1996) on the subject, we
assume that party activists and donors are more skewed toward the political extremes than
the electorate as a whole. In what follows we assume that political capital is spread across
the ideological spectrum with a distribution
 ()=exp|(05 − )|
where  ≥ 0, the size of  determining how skewed towards the extremes. (In the limiting
case of  =0political capital, like potential voters, is distributed uniformly).  is a scale
parameter.
Thus there is a stock of political capital part of which parties can obtain through choosing
their policy platforms. It is this that potentially drags parties away from the ideological
middle ground. We assume that activists and contributors help a party if they like it enough
(i.e. if the psychic gains of helping it exceed the trouble.) A natural assumption is that
the psychic gains of helping a party are inverse to your ideological distance from it, but the
cost (time, money and eﬀort) is constant. Let  be the critical ideological distance. Holding
public good spending constant ’s range of activists therefore stretch from  − to  +.
The centrifugal force follows from the parameter : parties can increase their political capital
by moving away from the centre.
As with potential voters, we assume that activists and donors are also susceptible to
good governance.16 T oi n c o r p o r a t et h i si d e aw ea s s u m et h a ti fp a r t y spends more than
16In the case of activists this seems obvious. In the case of donors a possible foundation for this argument
13party , that will widen ’s range of capital, and narrow that of ,b y ( − ) at either
end (this amount of course can be positive or negative). Given the symmetrical distribution
of both potential voters and political capital between left and right, it follows that the two
parties’ incentives, as they choose public spending and ideological distance from the centre,
are identical. So in any Cournot-Nash equilibrium the parties’ positions are symmetrical i.e.
 +  =1and  −  =0 .
Given this structure it is possible that there are activists and donors simultaneously
within distance  of both parties. In this instance we assume that they work for the one
to which they are closest. In Cournot-Nash equilibrium, this amounts to working for  ()
if their ideological score is less (greater) than 0.5. Also note that the range of activists is
truncated at 0 and 1, so that ’s leftmost activist will be at max(0  − ). But, precisely
because of the truncation,  − will always be non-negative: as long as  −0,am o v e
to the centre would gain both potential voters and centre-ground political capital without
losing any of the ideologically-extreme capital. Hence max(0  − )= − .








 =m i n(  + 05).



















The comparative statics (i.e. how political capital responds to changes in ideological stance)
can now be considered. Suppose  increases by  ( moves towards the centre.) Given




capital on the left. If its stock of activists is abutting that
comes from Prat (2002), discussed above. Donors recognise that higher quality (better governance) politicians
are more likely to be elected, and hence are more predisposed to donate.









































− exp[(05 −  + )]
´
= − (5)
Equation (5) gives a useful and simple result: when the left-wing party marginally shifts to
the centre, its relative political capital falls proportionately to its existing stock. Thus even
though the centrist shift increases capital in the centre, and may also eat into the opposition’s
capital, the net eﬀect on relative political capital is still negative due to the larger loss on
the party’s extremist wing.
3.3 Ideological Equilibrium
Now consider how the parties choose their ideological position so as to maximize their ob-




















The last equality follows from the fact we are considering a Nash equilibrium where pre-
shock votes are equal and  = . Substituting in  = 1−,p l u st h ef a c t st h a ti n








































If, therefore,  is less than this critical value (call it ∗), it will always pay  (and )t o
move nearer the centre, and the two parties will converge at  =  =0 5.I f ∗,i t
will always pay  to move away from the centre. However it will not end up at  =0 ,b u t
rather at  = , the point at which, as we have discussed, any further leftward move results
in an unambiguous loss of votes.17 , by similar reasoning will end up at  =1− .
The intuition of this result is as follows. As capital becomes less important in delivering
the vote (i.e. as  falls), parties move to the centre. This always picks up potential votes,
but now does so at a reduced cost in terms of political capital. If the stock of capital is
very skewed towards the political extremes (high ), the move to the centre as  falls will
be delayed, but there will always be some  low enough to precipitate it. By contrast, if
 =0 , parties converge at all positive .W h e n =0 , activists have the same rectangular
distribution as voters. It follows that, each time party  inches towards the centre it loses
two left-wing activists and gains one centrist one from party . Both parties are therefore
down one activist, and party  has nothing to lose by moving towards the centre. Since it
will be gaining potential voters by doing so, it will move to the centre. The value of  is
17Equation (8) depends on (5), which was derived explicitly on the basis that  ≥ .A t  , therefore,
(5) ceases to hold and / becomes positive whatever the values of  and .T h i si sw h y cannot
occur in equilibrium.
16beside the point. (If, contrary to our assumption,  were actually negative, this would all be
true a fortiori.)
But, unless  ≤ 0, we have discontinuity. Parties are either at the centre, with  =
 =0 5 or polarized to the point that their leftmost (rightmost) activist is the leftmost
(rightmost) person in the country, the point where  = . We will call these alternatives
t h e‘ m e d i a nv o t e r ’o u t c o m ea n dt h e‘ p o l a r i t y ’o u t c o m e . 18
In summary the model predicts convergence or divergence depending on equation (8). It
is possible that the model provides a vehicle for understanding the increased polarization of
political parties in the US in the 1980s documented by Abramowitz and Saunders (1998).19 If
the value of  increases, then a tipping point may be reached at which the two parties diverge.
One tentative possibility is that  might have increased with the development of widespread
mass media and television advertising. Whilst this hardly represents a test of the model,
we observe that political competition in Anglo-Saxon countries seems to ﬂuctuate between
consensual and polarized politics, and has on occasion switched rather rapidly. In contrast
to most models of political competition, which either predict convergence or divergence, the
model proposed here can accommodate both depending on the strength of .
4 The Quality of Government
So far we have seen the two parties choosing ideological locations. Whether they converge on
the centre, or locate themselves so as to maximize political capital, depends on the value of
18The ‘median voter’ and polarity’ outcomes would merge in the event of  =  =0 5.W er u l eo u ts u c h
a high value of  as implausible.
19Heath et al (1985) also document a marked shift in the 1980s towards polarized two-party competition
in the UK.
17. In this section we consider how the choice of public spending,  (and therefore equilibrium
rent-seeking) depends on the model parameters. Social welfare therefore depends on ,a n d
it turns out that  itself depends crucially on the importance of political capital in driving
votes, that is the parameter . Given this relationship, we discuss possible means by which
 m i g h tb em o d i ﬁed so as to maximize the quality of government, and compulsory voting
in particular. As in the previous section the approach taken is to aggregate over political
capital. The next section examines the eﬀects of limits on particular types of campaigning
activity.













Maximizing welfare thus comes down to maximizing /, i.e. making a party’s election












+( 1− ) (10)








.B u tt h es i z eo f

 itself depends on whether ( − ),t h el e f t
20Thus in a deterministic version ( =0 ),  =1i . e .t h ep a r t i e sc o m p e t er e n t sd o w nt oz e r oa st h e ys e e k
election.
18frontier of activism, is zero (as in the polarity outcome) or greater than zero (as in the
median voter outcome). The next two subsections analyze these two cases separately and
section 4.3 puts them together to ask how might be modiﬁed so to optimize the quality of
government.
4.1 Case 1: The Median Voter Outcome ( ∗,  =0 5)
Here a rise in  will, on our above assumptions, rake in activists at both ’s fringes and










=2 (1 + exp()) (11)
Substituting (11) into the ﬁrst order condition (10), and using (4), (which gives the result
that when  =0 5,  =








+ (1 − ) (12)
Our objective is to see how public spending, , responds to changes in the relative importance
of the two arguments in the VPF, i.e. to the parameter .S i n c e is monotonically increasing
in /, the condition for /  0 is that 







When (13) is fulﬁlled any increase in  is good for welfare, so that the optimum within the
range is its top end,  = ∗.W h e n i t i s n o t f u l ﬁlled, political capital is not suﬃciently
19sensitive to good government. The ideal is  =0 , i.e. we would like potential voters to have
maximum say in the formation of government.
The intuition here is that the incentive to govern better (raise ) depends on how many
extra votes this would bring in. The more freely the supply of a factor (potential voters or
political capital) responds to better government, the more the standard of government will
itself respond to that factor carrying more weight. If the supply of, say, political capital is
sensitive to  and the vote is sensitive to the supply of political capital, the electoral payoﬀ
from giving up rents is high and parties will act accordingly.
4.2 Case 2: The Polarity Outcome ( ∗,  = )
If  −  =0t h e r ei sn om o r ec a p i t a lo nt h el e f t w a r df r i n g et or a k ei ni f rises any more.
(i.e. the most left-wing person in the country is already working for party .) Consequently
 gains no activists at − =0by improving its behavior. But it still gains activists at its
rightward fringe + (= 2) and, because the rise in  gives an equivalent rise in −,








|=2 + |=1−2 + |=1
¢
= (exp(05)+2e x p[ (05 − 2)]) (14)
Substituting (14) into (10), and using (4), which gives the result that when  = ,  =








exp(05)+2e x p[ (05 − 2)]
exp(05) − exp[(05 − 2)]
+ (1 − ) (15)
20The condition for /  0 is again that 




4(exp(05)+e x p[ ( 0 5 − 2)])
(exp(05) − exp[(05 − 2)])
 (16)
Once again, as in the median voter case (13), any fall in / makes / more likely to be
negative. We have already seen the essential intuition. Low / means there is relatively
little mileage to be got from trying to please activists and donors; it is thus potential voters’
opinions which will be more eﬀective in stopping governments from taking too many rents.
We therefore want the power of potential voters to be enhanced still more by lower .
Think of the activists and potential voters as two vigilantes, both trying to enforce good
government. If you have two vigilantes and two sticks, you get maximum enforcement when
the bigger vigilante gets the bigger stick. So when / is low (high), low (high)  will raise
.
4.3 Government quality and the potency of political capital
Here we put the insights of the previous two subsections together to analyze the relationship
between government quality, , and the parameter  - the potency of political capital in
delivering votes. We also now drop the  and  subscripts for the rest of this section,
because the results, following from (13) and (16) apply identically to either party. A ﬁrst
result is that if  increases to the point at which the ideological equilibrium tips from the
median voter to polarity, then there is a downward jump in government quality.
Proposition 1  undergoes a downward jump as  rises through ∗.




exp()−1 .W r i t i n gt h i sa s1
2 − 3
4,i tm u s th a v et h es a m es i g na s14−32
exp[(05−)] = −exp()−
3exp(05)+4.G i v e nt h a t and  are both positive (if  =0then ∗ =1 ), this expression
must be negative, so that / and hence  falls at  = ∗.
The logic behind this is that as  crosses ∗ from below, the parties diverge from the
centre. When the parties are located according to the polarity equilibrium higher  will no
longer pull in activists from the ideological fringe as they will be contributing and working
for party  anyway. Conversely when the parties are located according to the median voter
parties have incentive to appeal to political capital on both ﬂanks. Therefore, once political
capital becomes suﬃciently important (as  rises through ∗) to tip the equilibrium from
the median voter to polarity the incentive to spend falls and equilibrium rents rise.
Lemma 2 It is possible for / to be positive in ’s lower range and negative in its
upper, but not vice versa.



























and so, from Proposition 1, 
 (/) as well as 
 jumps downwards at  = ∗.G i v e n
that 
 (/) is independent of  at all other values of ,i tf o l l o w st h a t∗ is the only
p o i n ta tw h i c h 
 (/) (and hence / given that  is monotonically increasing in
/) can change sign. Hence /  0 at  ∗ necessarily implies /  0 at
 ∗ but not vice versa.
22The logic this time is as follows: / is positive when political capital is good at
inducing better government, i.e. when its allegiance is sensitive to the quality of government.
It will always be more sensitive in the median voter equilibrium because here higher  brings
in capital from both wings of the party,n o tj u s tt h e‘ m o d e r a t e ’o n e . T h u si f/ is
positive even in the polarity case, it will certainly be so when the median voter prevails.
Putting together Proposition 1, Lemma 1, and equations (13) and (16) gives us Fig. 1,
which summarizes the analysis of this section, depicting the three possible cases depending
on the relative responsiveness of political capital and potential voters to public spending.21
FIG 1 HERE
Let us now interpret and compare the situations in Fig. (1a), (1b) and (1c). Recall that
for levels of  below ∗ political capital is less important in terms of generating votes and
parties locate at the centre (the median voter outcome.) For levels of  greater than ∗,
political capital is suﬃciently important in the vote production function to give the polarity
outcome.
In Fig. (1a), activists and donors are more responsive to better government than voters
are, and hence more eﬀective at keeping the government up to the mark. As they become
more important to the government, therefore, government improves — but with an interrup-
tion as  crosses ∗. A tt h i sp o i n tg o v e r n m e n ts p e n d i n gno longer brings in activists and
donations from the extreme left (right) as well as centrist ones — parties become polarized
21There is a further detail in Fig. 1 that is not explicitly given by (13) and (16); namely that () ()
in Fig. (1a) but () () in Fig. (1b). This must always be the case, since the condition for () ()




exp(05)−exp[(05−2)] =  Then, from (12) and (15) 
 () − 
 ()=(1 − ∗)+∗ −  =
∗ ( − ). Hence () () iﬀ   . But this is simply condition (16) again, i.e. the necessary
and suﬃcient condition for being in Fig. (1a) rather than Fig. (1b).
23and the extremists would be helping them regardless of any improvement in the quality of
government. This one-oﬀ drop in the electoral rewards from pleasing activists an donors
produces a one-oﬀ drop in public spending.
In Fig. (1c) political capital is relatively insensitive to good government and it is potential
voters who are most swayed by the government giving up rents. Government, therefore,
improves with the reward to the government from pleasing potential voters (as  falls). If
 is low, then anything is better than  =1 , where the government faces a set of voters it
has no incentive to please and a set of activists who give it little thanks when it does. As 
rises, government spending falls, exacerbated by the one-oﬀ drop as  crosses ∗.
Fig (1b) is the intermediate case. When  is high, only the centrist activists and donors
respond to better government (the extremists are helping it anyway). This is suﬃcient for
the situation to resemble Fig (1c). But when the radicals’ response kicks in as  falls through
∗, this not only produces the standard jump in , but also gives the government enough
“buyable” activists for the balance of incentive to change, tipping us into the world of Fig
(1a). Further reductions in  are now undesirable; the ideal is to be just to the left of ∗.
So what is the optimal value of ? To an important extent this depends on which of the
three scenarios we are in. In case (1c), anything which makes a party’s vote less dependent
on eﬀective organization is unambiguously good for welfare. In case (1b), if  ∗ (the
ideological equilibrium is polarized) then again any increase in  improves government. In
(1a),  =0(organization irrelevant) is the worst outcome, but there is still a range of  in
the neighborhood of ∗ in which a reduction in  suﬃcient to tip the ideological equilibrium
from polarity to the median voter outcome can increase the quality of government. In sum
in many instances a reduction in  is found to be desirable.
24This raises the possibility that  m i g h tb e‘ ﬁne-tuned’. One possibility is compulsory
voting. When voting is compulsory, then theoretically at least turnout is guaranteed and
mechanisms to get the voters out might be expected to be less important. In terms of the
model presented here  would fall. However, even under compulsory voting it is unlikely that
party workers and advertising would ever be completely superﬂuous, as a look at Australia
will show. There is still a role for suasion, encouragement, and knocking up one hour before
the polls close. Nonetheless by varying the penalties for not voting the potency of compulsory
voting would change, and consequently  might itself be altered. If compulsory voting does
serve to reduce  then as noted above it could conceivably lead to an improvement even
in case (1a), provided that  is initially greater than ∗. In case (1b), moving to  =0is
always an improvement when  ∗ and always bad when  ∗. Compulsory voting,
even assuming it does not lead to  =0 , will be an improvement if it has the eﬀect of
making  fall below the ∗ boundary.
Empirical research often ﬁnds that there are systematic party diﬀerences in ideology, as
found e.g. in the US by Ansolabehere et al (2001) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984 and 1997)
and internationally within analyses of Manifesto content (Budge et al, 1987). In the context
of our model this evidence suggests that  is high enough for democracies to end up between
points C and D in Fig 1 regardless of the sensitivity of political capital to good governance.
Ar e d u c t i o ni n of any size would unambiguously improve government in cases (1b), and
(1c). If  is close to (but greater than) ∗ then a reduction in  of the right size would also
improve government quality. Assuming compulsory voting does reduce the role of capital (to
t h ee x t e n tp e o p l en o wg oa n dv o t ea n y w a y ) ,i tw o u l dr a i s ee c o n o m i cw e l f a r ei nb o t ht h e s e
cases. The same could be said for on-line voting, or anything which either reduces the cost
25of voting or raises the cost of not voting.
5T h e e ﬀects of legal limits on campaign expenditure
We now generalize the vote production function to consider the consequences of legal limits on
total election spending, as well as separate limits at the national and local levels. In contrast
with Section 3, instead of examining how government quality is driven by the importance
of political capital, that is through the parameter , we now examine the consequences of
limiting aspects of . Farrell and Webb (2000) document limits on total campaign spending
in general elections in Canada, France, Ireland, Japan as well as in presidential elections
in the US. There are also limits on spending at the constituency level in the UK and New
Zealand. The analysis requires a more exact speciﬁcation of the role of campaign ﬁnance:
not only have we been using ‘political capital’ to aggregate volunteers and money, but money
spent on a national campaign plays a diﬀerent role to that spent securing the election of local
candidates. In order to separately analyze the eﬀects of local and national limits we rewrite
the production function for votes as:
 = 

1 (2 + )
 
1− (17)
where 1 is money spent on the national campaign (advertising, broadcasts, spin etc.) and
 captures the eﬀectiveness of this spending, 2 is money spent on local campaigns and  is
the eﬀort put in by volunteers (who may also give money.) In the absence of legal restrictions,
ap a r t y ’ sm o n e y( )c a nb ed i v i d e db e t w e e n1 and 2 as it pleases. For simplicity we
26assume that 2 and  are perfect substitutes in the production of votes. (Treating them
as partial substitutes merely complicates the mathematics without producing any diﬀerence
in the results.) We also now have increasing returns in the sense that doubling 2,  and
 doubles the vote even if 1 stays the same. This is because we are taking the resources
bought by 1 as non-excludable: if you get twice as many potential voters, each getting as
much local attention as before, you don’t need to put on any more party political broadcasts
because everyone can watch the existing ones.
Once again, we want to know what arrangements will maximize welfare by maximizing














































In linking  to ,w ea r en o ta s s u m i n g depends only on .T h i s w o u l d b e t o i g n o r e
the money given to political parties in the hope of receiving favors. All we are saying is
that, ceteris paribus, a party which hands rents back to the country may get more ﬁnancial
support as a result, and will not get any less i.e. / ≥ 0.








,a n d =0 5 which, with
























+ (1 − )















+ (1 − ) (19)
Suppose initially that there is no limit on election spending. Then the VPF tells us that
















2+. But optimization requires that  /1 =  /2,w h i c hi nt u r n
(given the form of the VPF) implies that 2 +  = 









+ (1 − ).( 2 0 )
Now we can see whether legal limits on campaign spending would increase social welfare, by
examining what happens to / under alternative rules.




still holds. If  increases by one unit you redistribute the existing money to the same eﬀect.
23We assume that   . Were this not the case,  /1 would exceed or equal  /2 even
when 2 =0 . i.e. there would be zero local spending.
285.1 Total spending limited to ∗


















+ (1 − ) (21)
Clearly, if ∗ =  then (21) is a worse outcome than (20), i.e. social welfare jumps
downwards if the spending limit is set inﬁnitesimally below what parties would have chosen
for themselves. The logic is simple: we have removed one of the incentives to govern well
(that you will have more money to spend on re-election) and put nothing in its place. The
RHS of (21) is in fact declining in ∗: if you are going to restrict spending at all, the bigger
the restriction the better.24 This is again straightforward: any limit removes the party’s
incentive to please donors so we want to maximize its incentive to please activists instead.
This is done by removing the substitute resource of locally-spent money.
But is there any limit on total spending which will be better for welfare than no limit?





+ (1 − ) (22)




 , i.e. it all
turns on whether better government produces a larger proportional increase in activism or
campaign ﬁnance (Fig. 2).
FIG 2 HERE
In case (i) donors are more responsive than activists to public good provision. In this
24We hesitate to say the optimum is literally zero because a small amount of election spending may have
genuine informative content.
29instance any limit on total spending is detrimental. In case (ii) activists are more responsive
than donors, but still a partial limit increases rent-seeking due to the removal of the incentive
to please donors. Nonetheless, in both cases increasing the severity of the limit increases the
returns through good governance to pleasing activists; in case (ii) the best policy would be
to take advantage of this to the extent of an outright ban on any campaign spending, thus
maximizing the eﬀect of the activists. In both cases a partial limit fails to maximize the
quality of government.
5.2 A limit on national spending (∗
1) but not on local spending

























+ (1 − ) (23)
The RHS is now increasing in ∗
1; the more permissive the limit, the higher social welfare. It
follows that limiting national spending, while leaving local spending unrestrained, is always
a bad policy. The intuition follows straight on from that of the previous case. The only
good a limit on total spending could do was to force parties to pay more attention to their
volunteers by starving them of local cash. This eﬀect is no longer present, and thus the
spending limit proposed here is a pure bad25 (Fig. 3).
FIG 3 HERE
25The comparison between (23) and (20) would be more complicated if restricting 1 aﬀected the value
of  via its eﬀect on . We assume, however, that a party’s funding depends on its relative (to the other
party) quality of government which, in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium, will be unaﬀected.
30In contrast to the case of a limit on total spending policy, there is no discontinuity in
/ as ∗
1 approaches the freely chosen 1 of





+, i.e. equation (23) converges to (20). The bottom line here is that a limit on national
spending alone simply serves to blunt the return in votes to political capital and in doing so
removes an incentive to please donors through better government.
5.3 A limit on local spending (∗
2) but not on national spending.








































+ (1 − ) (24)
















This can be either positive or negative, but it can be seen by inspection that the second
derivative of (/) with respect to ∗









2.L e t 
∗
2 be the value of ∗
2 that solves this equation, and let 
2
31be unconstrained 2. Then, if 
∗
2 ≤ 0, / will be increasing in ∗




2 , / will be decreasing in ∗
2 (Fig. 4ii), and if 0  
∗
2  
2 there will be
a pessimal limit on local spending, from which either a reduction or an increase would raise
welfare (Fig 4(iii) and (iv)). How is this so? We have the same two counteracting eﬀects
as in the case of a limit on total spending: limiting spending reduces the incentive to raise
money but increases the incentive to raise volunteers. If the limit is low the second eﬀect is
strong (the scarcer the local cash, the greater the eﬀect of making it scarcer still) but the
ﬁrst one is weak (the national campaign is awash with money that can’t be spent locally;
therefore the incentive to raise more is so weak that a change in ∗
2 can have very little
eﬀect on it.) If the limit is high, the situation is reversed. So if ∗
2 is already low, reducing
it is more prone to increase welfare than when it is high, i.e. the curve relating ∗
2 to welfare
must be convex and may be U-shaped. If it is U-shaped, the question again arises of which
is preferable, no limit (as in Fig.4(iii)) or a zero limit (Fig.4 (iv).) The answer, once again,


































But is a local limit ever the optimum? The answer is no: there are no circumstances
26Once again, there is no discontinuity as the cash limit ceases to bind. (As  − 2 (= 1) →

+ ( + ),a n d(2 + ) → 
+ ( + ), i.e. (24)→(20))
32when it is preferable to either a total limit or no limit.
Proposition 2 A purely local limit on spending can never be the optimal policy.
Proof. We have already seen that if there exists ∗
2 preferable to 
2 ,t h e n∗
2 =0is
preferable to any other ∗
2. To prove the proposition, it is therefore suﬃcient to show that
(∗
2 =0 )Â 
2 ⇒ (∗ =0 )Â (∗
2 =0 ) . We have already seen that (∗









 ⇒ (∗ =0 )Â (∗
2 =0 ) . And (22) and (25)










which completes the proof.
¥
So a ﬁnite but non-zero limit on local but not national campaign spending, as found in
the UK and New Zealand, is incompatible with maximizing the quality of government.
The eﬀects of diﬀerent limits on campaign spending can be summarized as follows. If
the supply of activism is more responsive to good government than the supply of campaign
ﬁnance, the lower the limit on total election spending the better. This maximizes the eﬀec-
tiveness of the reward to politicians to good government. If things are the other way round,
any limit on election spending is a mistake. Second, it is never optimal to restrict national
level spending on its own, this simply removes an incentive to provide better government.
Third, ﬁnite limits on local spending are never optimal, though it is possible that an outright
ban could be.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we analyze the importance of campaign advertising and ﬁnance in determining
voting equilibria and the quality of government. In a model of probabilistic voting the
33equilibrium level of rent-seeking, hence the quality of government depends on the potency,
and the permitted level of political capital.
Government quality is maximized when parties can buy the largest number of additional
votes by improving its performance and reducing its rent-seeking or wasteful activities. The
lesson from Section 4 is that in many cases, there may be good reason to reduce the potency
of political capital in driving voting, that is ﬁnd means to reduce the size of the parameter .
A possibility is compulsory voting. If party organizations are valuable in improving turnout,
then making turnout mandatory should reduce . Certainly, if  = ∗ + ,w h e r e is
suﬃciently small then a reduction in  to the point that the ideological equilibrium tips from
polarity to the median voter, then the quality of government will increase. This essentially
is because parties can obtain votes through better government from two ideological wings
instead of just one. Similary if political capital as a whole is less responsive than potential
voters to public good provision, then anything which makes it less important will make the
total vote more responsive to rents, and so deliver better government in equilibrium.
Because of concerns that contributors inﬂuence policy, limits on expenditure and dona-
tions have been called for and implemented in many diﬀerent countries. However, the core
argument of this paper is that there needs to be a clear delineation between limiting the
potency of ﬁnance in delivering the vote and limiting the quantity of ﬁnance available or
usable to parties. The general case that we make here is that whilst legislation to reduce
potency may frequently be desirable, in many cases limits on ﬁnance are counterproductive.
In Section 5 we split political capital into money and volunteer eﬀort. In the case of total
expenditure the question of whether ﬁnancial limits improve government quality depends
on which factor has the greater power to deter rent-seeking, i.e. which factor has the more
34elastic supply as government improves. If volunteers are the more elastic factor, then the
tighter the limit on total spending the better. Nonetheless, it is always the case that a move
from laissez faire to a weak limit reduces government quality, simply as a consequence of
removing an incentive raise ﬁnance by reducing rent-seeking. Furthermore ﬁnite limits on
particular types of spending, as used in a number of countries, are never socially optimal. In
the case of national-level spending, limits again simply blunt incentive to improve govern-
ment quality. In the case of local spending, which is more obviously directly substitutable
with local activism, then in most cases partial limits are found to reduce government quality.
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